I
I learned of the death of this great philosopher many months after it happened and I hurt a lot even though my contact with his intellectual work (almost) was limited to his lucid critique of a capabilities approach Amartya Sen (1), since his work around the thought of Marx (almost) had not read. Although he had his great work of 'youth', published in 1978: The theory of history Marx. defense (2) has been considered as the insignia of analytical Marxism, had read only, to the astonishment and admiration, the first chapter entitled 'Images of history in Hegel and Marx. " Upon learning of his death about six months ago acquired some of his other books and I've been reading greedily, increasing my admiration for his great ability and analytical rigor. In the introduction to the new edition of this book explains why youth is analytical Marxism and how he entered the stream. States (p. xvii):
decisive operation that created the analytical Marxism was the denial of the claim that Marxism has valuable intellectual methods themselves, which allowed the appropriation of a rich methodological approach it in their detriment, had shunned.
This is a central issue and deserves a detailed treatment left for future deliveries. I advance my admiration for Cohen, preventing any strong disagreements with him even on core issues. Today I will introduce this great philosopher. Let's start with some excerpts autobiographical
I feel very Jewish, but I do not believe in the God of the Old Testament. I was raised both to be Jewish to be anti-religious Jew and I am still very very atheism. My mother was proud of having become proletarian in Montreal after being born into a bourgeois family in Ukraine. My father, a worker too, belonged to an anti-religious Jewish organization, strongly anti-Zionist and pro-Soviet. My first school, run by this organization, was very political and anti-religious. In the afternoon the language of instruction was Yiddish. Jews and Jewish leftists teach us Jewish history (and other peoples) and the Yiddish language and literature. Even when told stories of the Old Testament Marxism permeated the vernacular. One of the materials in Yiddish was the History of Class Struggle. When the Vietnamese killing Americans, the Soviets reap Czechs, Serbs killed Bosnians, I feel angry, frustrated and sad. But when the Israelis destroy houses and kill men, women and children in the occupied territories, there is blood on my hands and cry in shame. Why do I feel so Jewish? Part of the answer is that Jewish tradition was pumped into my soul in childhood. But another reason is the anti-Semitism. Sartre exaggerated when he said it was the anti-Semite who creates the Jew. But who can deny that the Jewish anti-Semitic sentiment reinforces the Jew? ( If you're an egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? , Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 20-34.)
Cohen wrote several books. His last major book has an importance and complexity is similar to the first: Rescuing Justice and Equality (Harvard University Press, 2008). As a good Marxist (I think it was though their own doubts and those of many), Cohen tries to explain why in the last stage of his life (as reflected in this book) addressed issues of moral and political philosophy that Marxists used to despise. It begins with an anecdote. Travels to Czechoslovakia in 1964 to stay with his paternal aunt, whose husband (Norman Freed) was editor of World Marxist Review . One night, he says, raises the question about the relationship between, on one side of justice and moral values, and the other communist political practice. His uncle replied sardonically Do not talk about morality. I'm not interested in morality. Cohen explained that this meant that morality is bullshit. At the insistence of Cohen Freed said that what was reflected a moral commitment, he replied: It has nothing to do with morality. I'm fighting for my class. In its disregard of morality, Uncle Norman was expressing, in a vernacular, a venerable, deeply and disastrously misleading self-Marxist, says Cohen. The most important reason for the exclusion of moral issues is that Marxism presented itself to itself as the conscience of the struggle in the world, and not as a set of ideals given the world to adjust to them. Marxism, he says, as opposed to utopian socialism was scientific, based on hard facts Hard historical and economic analysis. That self-description was partly bluster, he adds, because the values \u200b\u200bof equality, community and human self-realization were certainly an integral part of the structure of Marxist beliefs. But the Marxists did not examine the principles of equality, or indeed any other value or principle. Instead, he says, his intellectual energy devoted to factual hard shell surrounding those values, the bold thesis that explain the history and capitalism. ( Ibid. Pp.101-103). Cohen continues:
But now Marxism has lost much of its shell, its hard shell of alleged facts. Almost no one defends it in the academy. To the extent that Marxism is still alive, and we can say that a kind of Marxism is alive in, say, the work of scholars in the U.S. as Roemer and Van Parijs in Belgium was presenting itself as a set values \u200b\u200band a set of designs for such securities. Now, therefore, much less than the utopian socialism of what once was able to announce it was. Its shell is cracked and crumbling, his weak stomach has been exposed (p.103).
Cohen describes how the loss occurred shell related factual equality. In the last acted together two trends irresistible guaranteed a future of material equality. On the one hand the expansion of organized social class (which became majority), whose social status in the disadvantaged side of the inequality, driving his fight for equality. On the other hand, the development of productive forces would lead to a world in which we could all be anything we wanted, which would remove the inequality. Cohen says that this second is not true because the world has rebelled and has natural limits to what can occur. On the other hand, the proletariat is ceasing to be what it was: the most exploited and deprived of the population, doctrine led to a worker's right to the fruits of their labor and egalitarian doctrine, coincide. But the exploited and the underprivileged are no longer the same and are no longer majority (even in the Third World, dominated the industrial reserve army). Thus, social values \u200b\u200bare no longer a berth in the capitalist social structure and, therefore, issues of political and moral philosophy have now become important for Marxism. Cohen therefore deal with them. However, global inequality is brutal and is increasing.
NOTES
1. When I published two theme issues on poverty in 2003 of the former Trade magazine (volume 53, numbers 5 and 6, May and June) I included excerpts from his essay "Equality of What?" On welfare, goods and skills, which shatters Sen's approach and proposes a path to rebuild it. This material I've used for many years in my courses on poverty in El Colegio de Mexico.
2. Far as I know, no English edition. The edition I cite is Karl Marx's Theory History. A Defence , Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000.
II
Although this is a small paperback book ( Why not socialism? , Princeton University Press, 2009, 83 pp.) The last published during his lifetime, and although in 2001 had already published an essay with the same name, which the volume is a modified version, symbolically it is interesting that the last volume is about socialism, thus closing the circle begun in his first book, as I mentioned in the previous release was theory Karl history Marx. A defense. Several friends and readers wrote to inform me that there is a English edition (published in Spain), but I could find on the internet. socialism why not? comprises five chapters. In the first Cohen shows that trips camp (camp hereafter) almost all prefer a socialist lifestyle. In the second makes explicit the principles of equality and community that prevail there. The third asks whether these social principles taken to scale, make it desirable socialism. In the fourth, if socialism is viable. The book ends with a short coda.
When we go camping no hierarchy between us and our common purpose is to have fun. Facilities and equipment available to us (although some are private) are under common control. There is some form of division of labor. In these contexts, the majority of people, including most of the anti-egalitarians accept and take for granted norms of equality and reciprocity, "says Cohen. He adds that, although we could imagine a camp based on market rules, most people would repudiate, as exemplified by hypothetical events: a) Harry is very good fishing, but it requires, for their contribution, only the best fish to eat. Others react angrily and say you do not have to compensate the good fortune that he did good fisherman. B) Sylvia is an apple and ask to be rewarded with less work and more space in the tent. Others reject their attitude. Cohen adds two similar examples. In all cases, others reject and mock the greed of those involved. He wondered then if there is the socialist obviously the best to organize a camp.
according to Cohen's principles prevailing in the camp are the radical equality (or social) and community opportunities. The second restricts the operation of the first to tolerate some inequality of result. Distinguishes three types of equal opportunities: a) Equality of opportunity that characterizes bourgeois (at least aspirations) to the liberal era: eliminating socially constructed constraints (formal and informal) status, such as being a servant, black or might add, women. b) Equal to eliminate left-liberal, in addition to the above, the obstacles to the social circumstances of birth and upbringing of the individuals who at a disadvantage (not chosen). An example of policies to create this kind of equality, are intended to compensate, at an early age, children in distressed conditions. c) social equality of opportunities, in addition to the above corrects the innate disadvantages individuals who, like previous ones, were not chosen by them. Therefore, if prevalent this form of equal opportunity, the differences in outcome reflect only, say, differences of taste and choice (especially between work and leisure) that are not inequalities because they represent a similar enjoyment of life.
However, later added a long and interesting passage, which seems to contradict what you just said, and he explains that there are three forms of inequality consistent with the principle of socialist equality of opportunity. The first type is the one who had spoken before, only reflect differences in taste / choice, and not a problem. The second is what he calls the unfortunate choice in which careless or little effort to reach disadvantaged and the individual repents of his previous elections. Cohen thinks that this form of inequality would generate, by itself, relatively little inequality. The truly worrisome form of inequality is the third, which reflects what the philosophers call option luck. Apart from the straight bet, which the player does not repent, the most important is the element of luck this option in the market inequalities that reflect bets on where to put their money or job [....] Cohen emphasized that while a may refrain from making straight bets, one can not evade the market betting on a market society, as the market, one might say, is a casino that is hard to escape, and inequalities that produce is contaminated, therefore, with injustice. Although second and third inequalities would not be convicted of justice are, however, repugnant to socialists when they occur in a large enough scale, says Cohen, because contradict the principle of community. Therefore, the socialist principle of equality of opportunity must be tempered by the community, if society is to display the socialist camp that makes it attractive, he adds.
explains the sense of community that uses: community is that people cares about others, and if necessary and possible, to take care of them. Our author discusses in detail the differences between community reciprocity and market reciprocity. The first is an anti-commercial principle according to which I will serve, so I can not get a change to do so but because you need or want my service, and you, for the same reason in it for me. In However, in the market the immediate motive of productive activity is typically a mixture of greed and fear, in proportions that change with the position of the person in the market and the personal. In the marketplace, serve others and to get something from them that desire, that is the motivation of greed, or to make sure that something I'm looking to avoid be avoided-that is the motivation of fear.
In the community refuses the instrumental nature of market relations. I have run out of space and chapters 3 and 4 and the coda of Cohen's book is very interesting, so I will dedicate to them the next installment. Go there as an advance-quoted phrase Cohen sang a song in Yiddish as a child in school: If we were to consider each other a neighbor, friend, brother, it would be a wonderful world, wonderful .
III
Chapters 3 and 4 Why not socialism? (Princeton University Press, 2009) Cohen tests the principles of socialist equality of opportunity and community, which led to (Chapter 2) as the constitutive principles of socialism in practice camping trips (hereinafter camp), when faced with questions if desirable and feasible and permanent macro scale. Many, he says, would notice the special features of the camp to distinguish it from the normal life of modern society, and would hesitate about the desirability and feasibility to apply the principles outlined in it: it is a recreational activity in which no groups that compete and in which a person known to all and in which there is no tension between family and social responsibilities. Cohen thinks the targeted differences do not undermine the desirability of social scaling the values \u200b\u200bof camp :
I do not think cooperation and selflessness displayed in the camp are fit only among friends or within a small community. In the mutual provision of a market society, one is essentially indifferent to the fate of the farmers whose food you eat. I still find attractive the feeling of a song left that I learned in my childhood and which begins: "If we were to consider each other a neighbor, friend, brother, could be a wonderful world, wonderful."
Turning to the issue of the viability of socialism and against the idea that only in recreational activities become attractive its principles, Cohen recalled that in emergencies such as flood or fire, people act based on the principles of the camp. Mexicans remember with great emotion the explosion solidarity, a feeling that we felt almost nonexistent after the 1985 earthquake. The viability of socialism Cohen discussing is whether we can get there from where we are, if not if socialism would work and whether it would be stable . Cohen points out two possible reasons why one might think that socialism is social scale viable: 1) the limits of human nature would be insufficiently generous and cooperative, and 2) even if the people are, or may become, in the right culture, generous enough, we do not know how to do (through appropriate incentives and rules) that generosity then move the wheels of the economy, in contrast with human selfishness that we know driving very well for this purpose. Cohen thinks that the main problem of socialism is not selfishness, but we do not know how to design the machinery that would operate, our lack of an adequate organizational technology, our design problem. After all, he adds, selfish and generous propensities lie in (almost?) Each and, in the real world, much depends on the generosity or, to put it more general and more negative, non-market incentives. For example, market signals needed to know how to cure diseases or what subjects to teach, but we are guided by a conception of human needs. However, once you transcend the goods that everyone wants because they are tied to the needs, and we are in the field of eligible goods , harder to know what to produce and how to produce without market signals. He adds that very few socialist economists would disagree with this assertion. I have the impression that Cohen, influenced by economists very much involved in Mainstream (Orthodox) of this discipline, had an idea of \u200b\u200bthe functioning of markets that are more like the neoclassical model of perfect competition than to actually existing markets . A world without oligopolies and without advertising tsunami, which eventually create demand for goods they decide to produce. A world in which consumer sovereignty prevails. Therefore argues that market signals reveal what it is worth producing (see the marked in italics in this quote). On the other hand, speaks of the sufferings of comprehensive planning: "We know that central planning, at least as practiced past is a bad recipe for economic success, at least once a company has provided itself with the essential elements of a modern economy. " Compare the ideal model of the market (and their efficiency, see graphic evidence that it is not) with the actually existing planning. Try combining therefore socialist principles with this picture of the market :
In light of the sufferings of comprehensive planning on the one hand, and the injustice of the market performance and the negligible commercial moral motivation, on the other, one wonders if it would feasible to maintain the benefits of information that provides the market with respect to what should be produced, while eliminating their budgets motivational and distributional consequences. Can we have the market efficiency in production, without the incentives and the distribution of rewards?
There are ways, he says, to introduce strong elements of community and equality in an economic system which prevails in the election based on self-interest: one, the welfare state out of the market that takes much of the provision for the needs, another, the market socialism. It is called socialism because it eliminates the division between capital and work: the population owns the capital of companies, owned by workers or by the state, face in competitive markets. Cohen is acutely aware that market socialism reduced without eliminating the socialist emphasis on economic equality. And also harms the community, since the market there is no reciprocity community. Not a fan of market socialism:
Market socialism does not fully meet the social standards of distributive justice and, though it does better than capitalism, is deficient because there is injustice in a system that gives high awards very talented people who organize cooperatives highly productive. Socialism is also poor, because the market exchange that lies at its center, works against the principle of community ... The history of the twentieth century encouraged the idea that the easiest way to generate productivity in a modern society is feeding the reasons greed and fear. But we must never forget that greed and fear are reasons disgusting. The old-style socialists often ignore in its moral condemnation of commercial motivation, instrumental justification of it by Adam Smith. Some super-enthusiastic socialist market trends, as opposed, forget that the market is intrinsically repugnant .
Citing in Coda of the book, ends his fine book Einstein and:
agree with Albert Einstein that 'socialism is humanity's attempt to go beyond predatory phase of human development. " Every market, even a socialist market system is a predation. Our attempt to go beyond the predation has failed so far. I do not think the proper conclusion is to give up.
IV
The new English edition (2000) of history theory of Karl Marx. defense, Gerald Alan Cohen (the original is 1978), includes a new introduction and four chapters added to the final. Today I will refer to Chapter 13, which calls into question the basic conclusion of his book: the theory of Marx's story is true. (1) This is expressed:
(...) I have to wonder if the theory that the book argues is true. now I do not think that historical materialism is false, but I'm not seguro cómo saber si es o no verdadero . Esto es opaco porque tenemos una concepción burda de qué tipo de evidencia lo confirmaría o lo rechazaría. Aunque traté en KMTH (así abrevia Cohen el título de la obra que hoy comento) de hacer la teoría más precisa y clarificar sus condiciones de confirmación, resultará evidente de los retos descritos en este capítulo que se requiere clarificación adicional. (p.341)
Contrástese esta visión del materialismo histórico como teoría científica sujeta a comprobación empírica, con la postura de György Márkus:
La teoría del progreso humano no es la 'positive science' of history . It only makes sense as an element of practical historic effort to give human history sense of progress, ie to create conditions under which all individuals can participate effectively and equally in the decisions that determine how to shape the social and institutional framework of their lives to live better, according to their own values \u200b\u200band needs. ('On the possibility of a critical theory', Desacatos, no. 23, p. 186)
Cohen warns approaching Márkus whose work apparently did not know (2), that "their reservations about the theory does not undermine his belief that is desirable and possible extinction of capitalist social relations and reorganize society on a just and humane "since the assessment of the main evils of capitalism depends on the ambitious thesis whole of human history. Nor does the possibility of establishing a society without exploitation and welcoming of human fulfillment, require or may derive, in the theses.
Cohen identifies four doctrines, all materialists, also made by Marx have in common the emphasis on productive activity: philosophical anthropology that views humans as essentially creative; theory of history, in which the growth of productive powers is the force that determines social change economics in which the value is explained in terms of working time, and a vision of future society: the supreme good of communism is that it allows a prodigious flowering of human talent.
Cohen argues that Marx's anthropology suffers severely from sidedness: it has an exclusive emphasis on the creative side of human nature [Cohen forget the central role that anthropology needs] but ignores the subject's relationship with himself and relationship with others is a means of relating to oneself. Marx says (Almost) left out the human need for self-identification or identity and its social manifestations . He argues that the human groups which are not economic, and religious communities and nations are so strong and durable in part because they offer individual need satisfaction of self-identification. By adhering to traditional communities, he adds, people have a sense of who they are . Cohen is thinking more of what Abraham Maslow called need membership in the identity. Maslow said
We often underestimate the profound importance of the neighborhood, the home territory of the clan, one of us, of our class, our gang. We have forgotten our profound tendencies to herd animals, to join, to belong. Any good company should meet this need, one way or another if it is to survive and be healthy. Therefore
Cohen notes that "interest in self-defined or placed are not satisfied with the development of human powers. And even when a person gains in self-understanding through creative activity, because they recognize themselves in what she has done, sing typically refers to himself as being that possesses a certain kind of capability, not it is able to locate itself as a community member . " The person, he adds, need to know who and how this connects with others, have to identify with some part of the objective social reality. Cohen introduces two caveats here: 1) does not argue that there is a need for religion or nationalism, but these have been historical satisfiers of the need for identity, 2) to talk about the need to understand yourself , says Cohen, who apparently interprets the need for identity, use understanding in a way that includes the false understanding. The most common forms of religion and nationalism are immature means of satisfying the need for identity, appropriate for a stadium less than fully civilized human development. (3)
As for the vision of the future, Cohen questions both Marx's idea of \u200b\u200bthe disappearance of the roles (which looked like human development restrictions) in communism as the ideal of multilateralism capacity development . Marx insisted that all undertake the full range of capabilities, but Cohen, asks what's wrong that someone is engaged in one or few activities, that are many talents of each individual without developing? He notes that there is a choice between a modest common development of various skills or virtuous development of one or a few, and there is no basis for asserting the superiority of one option. The full development does not necessarily follow the free development . Ends the chapter addressing the question of whether the unilateral nature of philosophical anthropology (which calls false) is the root of the lack of attention of historical materialism to the phenomena of nationalism and religion, and the implication that this may take the possible falsity of historical materialism, but the space is exhausted me and I could not criticize the narrow focus of Cohen's philosophical anthropology of Marx.
NOTES 1. There is an issue in English that translates the original work of 1978, Siglo XXI Editores Spain (thank this information to Paulette Dieterlen and two readers). In English the book is: Karl Marx's Theory of History. A Defence , Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000, 442 pages. As shown, the uncertainties (see below) appeared in Cohen soon.
2. Towards the end of chapter Cohen expressed their insufficient mastery of the concept of human essence, which corresponds to their ignorance of Marxism and Anthropology György Markus, systematization unique concept of human nature in Marx. This is reflected in its surface treatment, as we shall see, Marx's philosophical anthropology.
3. Compare with the following ideas Erich Fromm expressed in Psychoanalysis of Contemporary Society : "A scale of humanity, the degree to which man becomes aware of itself as a separate self depends on how you leave the clan and the degree individuation process which has developed . A member of a primitive clan might express their sense of identity in the formula I am us, he can not conceive of himself as an individual who exists independently of its group. Although the development of Western culture was oriented in the direction of creating the basis for the full experience of individualism, for most it has not been more than a facade behind which hides a failure to acquire an individual sense of identity, which has been replaced by nation, religion, class and occupation. Instead of pre-individualistic identity, an identity is developed gregarious, in which the sense of identity depends on an unquestioned membership the crowd. "
V
in the previous release (07/01/1911) left open the question of Cohen's thesis ( expressed in chapter 13 of History Theory of Karl Marx. A Defense THKM ) that Marx's philosophical anthropology is unilateral since it leaves out the human need for identity and therefore diminish the importance of phenomena such as nationalism and membership in religious groups. I pointed out, however, that Cohen does not mention (so I guess I did not know) György's book Marxism and Anthropology Márkus (Grijalbo, 1973 and 1985) containing the full systematization (and only) of Marx's philosophical anthropology, whose consideration (albeit partial and brief) can help discern if Cohen is right .
First, Fromm has pointed out that the majority of individuals in modern societies are incapable of taking an individual identity and hide in a modified form of primitive human identity (I am us): I am the crowd (see footnote No. 3 of the previous release). Secondly, I note that neither Marx nor Márkus made a list or outline of human needs, which noted the omission of some of them and, above all, make the omission of something that becomes false philosophical anthropology Marx, is misguided and disproportionate. Even in the scheme of Maslow's needs include the need for identity, but the membership (group). In contrast, in the conceptions of needs Fromm and Max Neef and co-authors, identity or sense of identity is an explicit need. (1) Third, it is necessary to state clearly that people need to belong to a social group but this does not necessarily means that our identity (who also, in my opinion, is a universal need) can not be an individualist-universalist . Maslow said that self-actualizing people (those who have managed to realize their potential power), "Identified by mankind. They have a deep feeling of identification, sympathy and affection for human beings in general, as if they were all one family. However, few understand They are like foreigners wherever they live. " No one would classify as false the theory of Maslow's needs by omitting the need for identity. Although Marx and Markus do not make a list of human needs, we find in philosophical anthropology first systematized by the second, a series of elements that, in my opinion, point to the need to group identity (I quote extracts do not necessarily joining literals of the work of Markus and I'll comment in brackets):
First, man is a generic entity, ie a social and community . (2) This description of man as community means, first, that man can not take a human life, no man can be such only in relation to others and a result of this relationship . On the other hand, means that the individual is not individual human only insofar as it appropriates the skills, the behaviors, ideas, etc., originated and produced by individuals who have preceded or co-exist with it, and assimilates them (more or less universally) to his life and activity . Thus, the concrete human individual as such is a product itself social-historical. The story of a single individual, says Marx, can not boot in any way the history of previous and contemporary individuals, but is determined by it ( German Ideology). The human specific concrete individuality does not arise only through active participation in the world caused by man, through a certain ownership of it. [So far it is clear that the man, regardless of their perceptions, is embedded in the Community, and partially determined by it, and switches to change it]. But on the other hand, the interrelationships between individuals are never immediate natural relations, are always the traffic budget [exchange] material and spiritual are given these individuals. The social nature of man is not just the act of production. Marx attributes a particular role in the genetic process of the humanization of society to natural relationships between the sexes and between generations. Sociality is an essential feature of the whole individual and penetrates all forms of vital activity . [Therefore, sociality is also an essential feature of consciousness, including their sense of belonging and identity]. Community life, social, also produces new individual needs, above all the need humane treatment. The production is of social character in the concrete sense individuals begin to produce for each other , their products complement each other, their work becomes an integral component of a real total social work, and the products become product Common collective worker. [With the extended division of labor the community or society begins to change]. The activity of the individual is objectively dependent activity of a field of individuals ever wider; while individuals are created for more historical conditions elementary, in which they can appropriate the experience, knowledge and the world's wealth accumulated by humanity, and use. Process in which man becomes a social being universal. The history of the hordes, tribes and ethnic groups gradually rise to universal history, and the individual himself becomes a universal being, a being-historical. This expansion of traffic between the men produced the conditions of individual human autonomy regarding their own environment and, on the basis of this autonomy, the conditions for deployment of human interiority, individuality real human. The man does not become really individual, but in the course of historical development, precisamente porque a través del tráfico cada vez más universal, dicha evolución disuelve aquellas pequeñas comunidades . [Marx ve la posibilidad de un nuevo sentido de identidad, que rebasa al comunitario, al de la nación, similar a la de los autorrealizadores de Maslow antes citada]. En este sentido la universalización y la individualización del hombre son un proceso unitario , aunque esa unidad no se realice, durante toda una gigantesca época histórica, sino a través de contraposiciones (la universalización es en la era de la alienación la unidad de la individualización y la despersonalización).
La antropología filosófica marxista contains all the elements, though not explicit, as shown, to establish the need for identity. But displayed it in a dynamic sense: the identity of the family and clan, to that of the tribe and the nation, until the identity of the species, gender identity . I believe that Cohen did not appreciate this positive trend to overcome the parish. In any case, we can give to Cohen that Marx underestimated the resistance and the difficulties of the transition from us I am the "I am I, a member of the species Homo sapiens , but fully individualized."
NOTES 1. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5 my doctoral thesis (see my web page ad at the end of delivery) discusses the theories of Maslow, Fromm and Max Neef et al.
2. The term appears to be generic Being species (species-being) in the English translations of the manuscripts of 1844. That makes the meaning clearer. In English, the noun does not support species adjective, as specified is used in a much more comprehensive.
Source: La Jornada, http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/12/17/index.php?section=opinion&article=034o1eco ,
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/12/24/index.php?section=opinion&article=024o1eco , http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2010/12/31/index.php?section=opinion&article=025o1eco ,
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/01/07/index.php?section=opinion&article=024o1eco ,
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2011/01/14/index.php?section=opinion&article=030o1eco
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